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Abstract
Private information retrieval (PIR) protocols allow a user to retrieve a data item from a database without reveal-
ing any information about the identity of the item being retrieved. Specifically, in information-theoretic k-server PIR,
the database is replicated among k non-communicating servers, and each server learns nothing about the item re-
trieved by the user. The cost of PIR protocols is usually measured in terms of their communication complexity, which
is the total number of bits exchanged between the user and the servers. However, another important cost parame-
ter is the storage overhead, which is the ratio between the total number of bits stored on all the servers and the
number of bits in the database. Since single-server information-theoretic PIR is impossible, the storage overhead of
all existing PIR protocols is at least 2 (or k, in the case of k-server PIR).
In this work, we show that information-theoretic PIR can be achieved with storage overhead arbitrarily close to the
optimal value of 1, without sacrificing the communication complexity. Specifically, we prove that all known k-server
PIR protocols can be efficiently emulated, while preserving both privacy and communication complexity but signifi-
cantly reducing the storage overhead. To this end, we distribute the n bits of the database among s+ r servers, each
storing n/s coded bits (rather than replicas). Notably, our coding scheme remains the same, regardless of the spe-
cific k-server PIR protocol being emulated. For every fixed k, the resulting storage overhead (s+ r)/s approaches
1 as s grows; explicitly we have r 6 k√s(1+ o(1)). Moreover, in the special case k = 2, the storage overhead is
only 1+ 1s . In order to achieve these results, we introduce and study a new kind of binary linear codes, called here
k-server PIR codes. We then show how such codes can be constructed from Steiner systems, from one-step majority-
logic decodable codes, from constant-weight codes, and from certain locally recoverable codes. We also establish sev-
eral bounds on the parameters of k-server PIR codes, and tabulate the results for all s 6 32 and k 6 16. Finally,
we briefly discuss extensions of our results to nonbinary alphabets, to robust PIR, and to t-private PIR.
I. INTRODUCTION
Private information retrieval protocols make it possible to retrieve a data item from a database without disclosing
any information about the identity of the item being retrieved. The notion of private information retrieval (PIR) was
first introduced by Chor, Goldreich, Kushilevitz, and Sudan in [8], [9] and has attracted considerable attention since
(see [4]–[7], [12], [25], [29]–[31] and references therein). The classic PIR model of [9], which we adopt in this pa-
per, views the database as a binary string x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n and assumes that the user wishes to retrieve
a single bit xi without revealing any information about the index i. A naive solution for the user (hereinafter, often
called Alice) is to download the entire database x. It is shown in [9] that in the case of a single database stored on
a single server, this solution is essentially the best possible: any PIR protocol will require Ω(n) bits of communi-
cation between the user and the server. In order to achieve sublinear communication complexity, Chor, Goldreich,
Kushilevitz, and Sudan [9] proposed replicating the database on several servers that do not communicate with each
other. They showed that having two replicas makes it possible to reduce the communication cost to O
(
n1/3
)
, while
k > 3 servers can achieve O
(
(k2 log k)n1/k
)
communication complexity.
Following the seminal work of [9], the communication complexity of k-server PIR has been further reduced in
a series of groundbreaking papers. Ambainis [1] generalized the methods of [9] to obtain a communication cost of
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for all k > 2. This result remained the best known for a while until the O
(
n1/(2k−1)
)
-complexity bar-
rier was finally broken in [5]. Five years later, came the remarkable work of Yekhanin [31] who constructed a 3-server
PIR scheme with subpolynomial communication cost, assuming the infinitude of Mersenne primes. Shortly there-
after, Efremenko [13] gave an unconditional k-server PIR scheme with subpolynomial complexity for all k > 3. The
recent paper of Dvir and Gopi [12] shows how to achieve the same complexity as in [13] with only two servers.
All this work follows the orginal idea, first proposed in [9], of replicating the database in order to reduce the com-
munication cost. However, this approach neglects another cost parameter: the storage overhead, defined as the ratio
between the total number of bits stored on all the servers and the number of bits in the database. Clearly, the storage
overhead of the PIR protocols discussed above is k > 2. If the database is very large, the necessity to store several
replicas of it could be untenable for some applications. Thus, in this paper, we consider the following question. Can
one achieve PIR with low communication cost but without doubling (or worse) the number of bits we need to store?
This question has been settled in the affirmative in [19] for the case where one is willing to replace information-
theoretic guarantees of privacy by computational guarantees. Such computational PIR is by now well studied — see
[14], [19] for more information. However, in this paper, we consider only information-theoretic PIR, which provides
the strongest form of privacy. That is, even computationally unbounded servers should not gain any information from
the user queries. Somewhat surprisingly, despite the impossibility proof of [9], the answer to our question turns
out to be affirmative also in the case of information-theoretic PIR. Our results do not contradict [9]. To achieve in-
formation-theoretic privacy, one does need at least two non-communicating servers. However, these servers do not
have to hold the entire database, they can store only parts of it. We show that if these parts are judiciously encoded,
rather than replicated, the overall storage overhead can be reduced.
A. Our Contributions
We show that all known k-server information-theoretic PIR protocols can be efficiently emulated, while pre-
serving their privacy and communication-complexity guarantees (up to a constant), but significantly reducing the
storage overhead. In fact, for any fixed k and any  > 0, we can reduce the storage overhead to under 1+.
In order to achieve these results, we first partition the database into s parts and distribute these parts among non-
communicating servers, so that every server stores n/s bits. Why do we partition the database in this manner? The
main reason is that such partition is necessary to reduce the storage overhead. If every server has to store all n bits
of the database, then the storage overhead cannot be reduced beyond k > 2. However, in practice, there may be
other compelling reasons. For example, the database may be simply too large to fit in a single server, or it may
need to be stored in a distributed manner for security purposes. We observe that the number of parts s need not be
very large. With s = 2 parts, we can already achieve significant savings in storage overhead. With s = 16 parts, we
get a storage overhead of 1.06 (for 2-server PIR protocols).
Given a partition of the database into s parts, our construction consists of two main ingredients: 1) an existing
k-server PIR protocol in which the servers’ responses are a linear function of the database bits, and 2) a binary linear
code, which we call a k-server PIR code, with a special property to be defined shortly. We note that the first re-
quirement is very easy to satisfy: all the existing PIR protocols known (to us) are linear in this fashion. Thus our
primary focus in this paper is on the construction of k-server PIR codes.
The defining property of a k-server PIR code is this: for every message bit ui, there exist k disjoint sets of coded
bits from which ui can be uniquely recovered (see Section III for a formal definition). Although this property is
reminiscent of locally recoverable codes, recently introduced in [15], there are important differences. In locally re-
coverable codes, we wish to guarantee that every message bit ui can be recovered from a small set of coded bits,
and only one such recovery set is needed. Here, we wish to have many disjoint recovery sets for every message bit,
and we do not care about their size. To the best of our knowledge, codes with this property have not been previously
studied, and they may be of independent interest.
In this paper, we show how k-server PIR codes can be constructed from Steiner systems, from one-step majority-
logic decodable codes, and from constant-weight codes. We give an optimal construction of such codes for the
case where the number of parts s is small. We also establish several bounds on the parameters of general k-server
PIR codes, and tabulate these parameters for all s 6 32 and k 6 16. Finally, we briefly discuss extensions of our
results to nonbinary alphabets, to robust PIR, and to t-private PIR.
3B. Related work
There are several previous works which construct coded schemes for the purpose of fast or private retrieval.
The first work we know of for the purpose of coded private retrieval is the recent work by Shah et al. [23]. The
authors showed how to encode files in multiple servers with very low communication complexity. However, their
constructions require an exponentially large number of servers which may depend on the number of files or their
size. In another recent work [7], Chan et al. studied the tradeoff between storage overhead and communication
complexity, though only for setups in which the size of each file is relatively large. A similar approach to ours
was studied by Augot et al. [2], where the authors also partitioned the database into several parts in order to avoid
repetition and thereby reduce the storage overhead. However, their construction works only for the PIR scheme
using the multiplicity codes by Kopparty et al. [18] and they didn’t encode the parts of the database as we study
in this work.
Batch codes [17] are another method to store coded data in a distributed storage for the purpose of fast retrieval
of multiple bits. Under this setup, the database is encoded into an m-tuple of strings, called buckets, such that each
batch of k bits from the database can be recovered by reading at most some predetermined t bits from each bucket.
They are also useful in trading the storage overhead in exchange for load-balancing or lowering the computational
complexity in private information retrieval. Another recent work on batch codes was recently studied in [11].
C. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally define the PIR schemes studied in
the paper, namely the conventional PIR protocol and coded PIR protocols. In Section III we present our general
construction of coded PIR protocols and define the requirements on a k-server PIR codes that are used in this
protocol. Section IV studies several constructions of k-server PIR codes. In Section V, we study the storage overhead
of k-server PIR codes when the values of s and k are small, and in Section VI we study the asymptotic behavior
when either s or k is large. Finally, Section IX concludes the paper.
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section we formally define the PIR protocols we study in the paper. A linear code over GF(q) of length
n and dimension k will be denoted by [n, k]q or by [n, k, d]q where d specifies the minimum distance of the code.
In case the code is binary we will omit the field notation. For a positive integer n the notation [n] will refer to the
set {1, . . . , n}. We denote by ei the vector with 1 on its i-th position and 0 elsewhere. Let us revisit and rephrase
the formal definition of a PIR scheme, based upon the definitions taken from [5] and [25].
Definition 1. A k-server PIR scheme consists of the following:
1) k servers S1, . . . , Sk, each stores a length-n database x,
2) A user (Alice) U who wants to retrieve xi, for i ∈ [n], without revealing i.
A k-server PIR protocol is a triplet of algorithms P = (Q,A, C) consisting of the following steps:
1) Alice flips coins and based on the flip coins and i invokes Q(k, n; i) to generate a randomized k-tuple of queries
(q1, . . . , qk), of some predetermined fixed length. For j ∈ [k], the query q j will be also denoted by Q j(k, n; i).
2) For j ∈ [k], she sends the query q j to the j-th server S j.
3) The j-th server, for j ∈ [k], responds with an answer a j = A(k, j, x, q j) of some fixed length.
4) Finally, Alice computes its output by applying the reconstruction algorithm C(k, n; i, a1, . . . , ak).
The protocol should satisfy the following requirements:
• Privacy - Each server learns no information about i. Formally, for any k, n, i1, i2 ∈ [n], and a server j ∈ [k], the
distributions Q j(k, n; i1) and Q j(k, n; i2) are identical, where the distribution is over the coins flip in Step 1 of
the PIR protocol.
• Correctness - For each k, n and x ∈ {0, 1}n and i ∈ [n], the user deterministically outputs the correct value of
xi, that is C(k, n; i, a1, . . . , ak) = xi.
We follow the common figure of merit to evaluate the system storage efficiency according by its overhead [17],
[23]. Namely, the storage overhead of the system is the ratio between the total number of bits stored in the system
and the number of information bits. For example, the storage overhead of a k-server PIR scheme is k.
4Another special property of PIR protocols which will be used in our constructions is linearity. This property is
formally defined as follows.
Definition 2. A k-server PIR protocol P = (Q,A, C) is said to be a linear PIR protocol if for every n, j ∈ [k],
x1, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n, and a query q j, the following property holds
A(k, j, x1 + x2, q j) = A(k, j, x1, q j) +A(k, j, x2, q j).
Many, if not all existing PIR protocols, satisfy this linearity property, see for example [4]–[6], [9], [12], [29]–[31].
Lastly, we assume that the algorithm A is public knowledge in the sense that every server can compute the response
A(k, j, x, q) for any j ∈ [k], database x, and query q.
Before formally defining the coded version of a PIR scheme, we demonstrate the main ideas in the next example.
Example 1. Consider the following 2-server PIR scheme where each server stores an n-bit database x and Alice
wants to read the i-th bit xi, for some i ∈ [n]. Alice chooses uniformly at random a vector a ∈ {0, 1}n. The first
server receives the query a and responds with an answer of the bit a · x. The second server receives the query
(a+ ei) and responds with an answer of the bit (a+ ei) · x; see Fig. 1. Alice receives these two bits and their
sum gives the i-th bit xi, since
a · x+ (a+ ei) · x = a · x+ a · x+ ei · x = xi.
If the servers do not communicate with each other then since the vector a is chosen uniformly at random, the
value of i remains private. Moreover, the servers’ responses are linear functions of the stored data and thus the
protocol is a linear PIR protocol. Alice had to transmit 2n bits and 2 bits were received, so a total of 2n+ 2 bits
were communicated. The storage overhead of this scheme is 2 and note also that if one of the servers fails then it
is possible to retrieve the database x from the other surviving server.
Now, assume that the database x is partitioned into two equal parts of n/2 bits each, x1 and x2, where x1 =
(x1, . . . , xn/2), and x2 = (xn/2+1, . . . , xn). The database is stored in three servers. The first server stores x1, the
second stores x2, and the third one is a parity server which stores x1+ x2. If Alice wants to read the i-th bit where
i ∈ [n/2], she first chooses uniformly at random a vector a ∈ {0, 1}n/2. The first server receives the query a and
responds with the bit a · x1. The second server receives the query a+ ei and responds with the bit (a+ ei) · x2,
and the third server receives the query a+ ei and responds with the bit (a+ ei) · (x1 + x2). Alice receives those
three bits and calculates the bit xi according to the sum
a · x1 + (a+ ei) · x2 + (a+ ei) · (x1 + x2) = a · x1 + (a+ ei) · x1 = xi.
It is clear that both schemes keep the privacy of i. In the first scheme, the number of communicated bits is
2n+ 2, while in the coded scheme it is 3n/2+ 3. The storage overhead was improved from 2 to 3/2, and both
schemes can tolerate a single server failure. However, we note that the coded scheme requires one more server. 2
Fig. 1. Alice sends q1 = a and q2 = a+ ei to the servers. The servers respond with a · x and (a+ ei) · x and Alice recovers xi as their
sum. The value of i remains private as the vector a is chosen uniformly at random.
One may claim that the improvement in the last example is the result of using three instead of two servers. This
is indeed correct, however, assume that each server can store only n/2 bits. Then, the database x will have to be
stored over two servers and each of them would have to be replicated, resulting with a total of four servers instead
of three. Furthermore, the number of communicated bits would still remain the same, 2n + 2. Thus, under this
constraint, we can claim that we improved both the number of servers as well as the number of communicated bits.
We are now ready to extend the definition of PIR scheme to its coded version.
5Definition 3. An (m, s)-server coded PIR scheme consists of the following:
1) A length-n database x which is partitioned into s parts x1, . . . , xs, each of length n/s.
2) m servers S1, . . . , Sm, where for j ∈ [m] the coded data c j, stored in the j-th server, is a function of x1, . . . , xs.
3) A user (Alice) U who wants to retrieve the i-th bit from the database x, without revealing i.
An (m, s)-server coded PIR protocol is a triplet of algorithms P∗ = (Q∗,A∗, C∗) consisting of the following steps:
1) Alice flips coins such that based on the flip coins and i, she invokes Q∗(m, s, n; i) to generate a randomized
m-tuple of queries (q1, . . . , qm) of predetermined fixed length.
2) For j ∈ [m], she sends the query q j to the j-th server S j.
3) The j-th server, for j ∈ [m], responds with an answer a j = A∗(m, s, j, c j, q j).
4) Finally, Alice computes its output by applying the reconstruction algorithm C∗(m, s, n; i, a1, . . . , am).
The protocol should satisfy the privacy and correctness properties as stated in Definition 1.
The next section discusses the construction of coded PIR schemes based upon existing linear PIR protocols.
III. CODED PIR SCHEMES
In this section we will give a general method to construct coded PIR schemes. A key point in the construction of
coded PIR protocols is to use existing PIR protocols and emulate them in the coded setup. We first give a detailed
example that demonstrates the main principles of the construction.
Example 2. Assume there exists a 3-server linear PIR protocol P(Q,A, C) and a length-n database x. Assume
also that each server can store at most n/4 bits. If one wishes to invoke the PIR protocol P(Q,A, C), then first
the database x will be partitioned into four parts x1, x2, x3, x4. Thus, each of the four parts will be stored in three
servers so it is possible to invoke the 3-server PIR protocol. This results with 12 servers, each stores n/4 bits, and
thus the storage overhead is 3. We will show how it is possible to accomplish the same task with storage overhead
2, that is only 8 instead of 12 servers. Namely, we construct an (8, 4)-server coded PIR protocol P∗(Q∗,A∗, C∗).
We use a similar partition of the database x into four parts x1, x2, x3, x4 and encode them into 8 servers as
follows. The j-th server for j ∈ [8] stores the coded data c j as follows:
c1 = x1, c2 = x2, c3 = x3, c4 = x4,
c5 = x1 + x2, c6 = x2 + x3, c7 = x3 + x4, c8 = x4 + x1.
In a matrix form notation, these equations can be written in the following way
(c1, . . . , c8) = (x1, x2, x3, x4) ·

1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
 .
Thus, we encode using an [8, 4, 3] linear code where the last matrix is its generator matrix in a systematic form.
Assume Alice seeks to read the i-th bit from the first part of the database x, i.e. the bit x1,i, or xi where i ∈ [n/4].
She first invokes algorithm Q to receive the following three queries,
Q(3, n/4; i) = (q1, q2, q3).
Then, she assigns the 8 queries of the algorithm Q∗ to the 8 servers as follows
Q∗(8, 4, n; i) = (q1, q2, q3, q3, q2, q2, q3, q3).
Next, she sends these queries to the servers, which respond with the following answers as listed in Table I.
Due to the linearity property of the protocol P , Alice can calculate the following information from the second
and fifth servers
a′2 = a2 + a5 = A(3, 2, x2, q2) +A(3, 2, c5 = x1 + x2, q2)
= A(3, 2, x1, q2),
6TABLE I
PIR PROTOCOL FOR RETRIEVING FROM THE FIRST SERVER
Server Query Response
1 q1 a1 = A∗(8, 4, 1, c1 , q1) = A(3, 1, x1 , q1)
2 q2 a2 = A∗(8, 4, 2, c2 , q2) = A(3, 2, x2 , q2)
4 q3 a4 = A∗(8, 4, 4, c4 , q3) = A(3, 3, x4 , q3)
5 q2 a5 = A∗(8, 4, 5, c5 , q2) = A(3, 2, c5 = x1 + x2 , q2)
8 q3 a8 = A∗(8, 4, 8, c8 , q3) = A(3, 3, c8 = x4 + x1 , q3)
and from the fourth and eighth servers
a′3 = a4 + a8 = A(3, 3, x4, q3) +A(3, 3, c8 = x4 + x1, q3)
= A(3, 3, x1, q3).
She also assigns a′1 = a1. Finally, Alice retrieves the value of x1,i by applying the reconstruction algorithm
C∗(4, 4, n; i, a1, . . . , a8) = C(3, n/4; i, a′1, a′2, a′3)
= C(3, n/4; i,A(3, 1, x1, q1),A(3, 2, x1, q2),A(3, 3, x1, q3))
= x1,i = xi.
Now, assume that Alice wants to retrieve the i-th bit from the second server, x2,i, or xn/2+i for i ∈ [n/2]. As in
the first case she invokes the algorithm Q to receive
Q∗(4, 4, n; i) = (q2, q1, q3, q3, q2, q3, q3, q3),
where q1, q2, q3 are calculated according to Q(3, n/4; i) = (q1, q2, q3). However, the queries to the servers will
be slightly different, as summarized in Table II.
TABLE II
PIR PROTOCOL FOR RETRIEVING FROM THE SECOND SERVER
Server Query Response
1 q2 a1 = A∗(8, 4, 1, c1 , q2) = A(3, 2, x1 , q2)
2 q1 a2 = A∗(8, 4, 2, c2 , q1) = A(3, 1, x2 , q1)
3 q3 a3 = A∗(8, 4, 3, c3 , q3) = A(3, 3, x3 , q3)
5 q2 a5 = A∗(8, 4, 5, c5 , q2) = A(3, 2, c5 = x1 + x2 , q2)
6 q3 a6 = A∗(8, 4, 6, c6 , q3) = A(3, 3, c6 = x2 + x3 , q3)
Her next step is to calculate the following
a′2 = a1 + a5 = A(3, 2, x1, q2) +A(3, 2, c5 = x1 + x2, q2)
= A(3, 2, x2, q2),
a′3 = a3 + a6 = A(3, 3, x3, q3) +A(3, 3, c6 = x2 + x3, q3)
= A(3, 3, x2, q3),
and to assign a′1 = a2. Finally, Alice retrieves the value of x2,i by applying the reconstruction algorithm
C∗(4, 4, n; i, a1, . . . , a8) = C(3, n/4; i, a′1, a′2, a′3)
= C(3, n/4; i,A(3, 1, x2, q1),A(3, 2, x2, q2),A(3, 3, x2, q3))
= x2,i = xn/2+i.
2
In this example, we have not specified the queries to the other servers simply because they do not matter for the
reconstruction. Thus we can assign any query to preserve the privacy property. However, we note that the requests
7to the servers might differ depending on the part of the database from which Alice wants to read the bit, and the
different requests might reveal the identity of the data (in case the algorithm A does not depend on j then clearly
this is not a problem). A simple solution for this is to ask every server to return all possible outputs such that it
simulates each of the possible k requests. For example, if in the first scenario Alice assigns the query q1 to the
first server, then the server’s output consists of three parts:
A∗(8, 4, 1, x1, q1) = (A(3, 1, x1, q1),A(3, 2, x1, q1),A(3, 3, x1, q1)).
That way, Alice can choose the information required in order to compute the bit she wants to retrieve, and the
server cannot deduce which part of the database the bit is read from. Yet another solution, which improves the
download complexity, will be given as part of the proof of Theorem 5 below.
As we saw in Example 2, there are two important ingredients in the construction of coded PIR protocols:
1) A k-server linear PIR protocol.
2) An [m, s] linear code with special properties which are next specified.
Definition 4. We say that an s×m binary matrix G has property Ak if for every i ∈ [s], there exist k disjoint subsets
of columns of G that add up to the vector of weight one, with the single 1 in position i. A binary linear [m, s] code
C will be called a k-server PIR code if there exists a generator matrix G for C with property Ak. Equivalently, let
c = uG be the encoding of a message u ∈ {0, 1}s. Then C is a k-server PIR code if for every i ∈ [s], there exist k
disjoint sets R1, . . . , Rk ⊆ [m] such that
ui = ∑
j∈R1
c j = · · · = ∑
j∈Rk
c j.
The construction of k-server PIR codes will be deferred to Section IV. In particular, we will be interested in
finding, for given s and k the optimal m such that an [m, s] k-server PIR code exists, and the optimal value of m
will be denoted by A(s, k). In terms of the minimum distance, let us briefly note that the minimum distance of a
k-server PIR code is at least k.
We finish this section with the next theorem which provides the general result for the construction of coded
PIR protocols. In order to analyze the communication complexity, we denote the number of bits uploaded, down-
loaded of a k-server linear PIR protocol P , by U(P ; n, k), D(P ; n, k), respectively. For an (m, s)-server coded
PIR protocol P∗, U∗(P ; n,m, s), D∗(P ; n,m, s) are defined similarly.
Theorem 5. If there exists an [m, s] k-server PIR code C and a k-server linear PIR protocol P then there exists an
(m, s)-server coded PIR protocol P∗. Furthermore,
U∗(P∗; n,m, s) = m ·U(P ; n/s, k),
D∗(P∗; n,m, s) = m · D(P ; n/s, k).
Proof: The database x is partitioned into s parts x1, . . . , xs. Let G be a generator matrix of the code C. Then,
the data stored in the m servers is encoded according to
(c1, . . . , cm) = (x1, . . . , xs) · G.
Let P(Q,A, C) be a k-server linear PIR protocol and we will show how to construct an (m, s)-server coded PIR
protocol.
Assume Alice wants to read the i-th bit, i ∈ [n/s], from the `-th server, x`,i. First she invokes the algorithm Q
to receive k queries
Q(k, n/s; i) = (q1, . . . , qk).
According to the k-server PIR code C, there exist k mutually disjoint sets R`,1, . . . , R`,k ⊆ [m] such that for all
j ∈ [k], x` is a linear function of the data stored in the servers belonging to the set R`, j, that is,
x` = ∑
h∈R`, j
ch.
8Alice assigns the output of the algorithm Q∗ to be
Q∗(m, s, n; i) = (q∗1 , . . . , q∗m),
where for all j ∈ [k] and h ∈ R`, j, q∗h = q j. The other queries q∗h where h /∈ ∪ j∈[k]R`, j can be assigned arbitrarily.
Then Alice sends the query q∗h to the h-th server, h ∈ [m], and receives the answer
a∗h = A∗(s, r, h, ch, q∗h) = (A(k, 1, ch, q∗h), . . . ,A(k, k, ch, q∗h)).
From these answers she takes only the parts which are required to invoke the algorithm C, and are determined by
ah = A(k, j, ch, q∗h),
for h ∈ R`, j. Then, she assigns for j ∈ [k],
a′j = ∑
h∈R`, j
ah,
and finally Alice retrieves the value of x`,i by applying the reconstruction algorithm
C(k, n/s; i, a′1, a′2, . . . , a′k) = x`,i.
The correctness of the last step results from the linearity of the PIR protocol P , since for all j ∈ [k],
a′j = ∑
h∈R`, j
ah = ∑
h∈R`, j
A(k, j, ch, q∗h)
= A(k, j, ∑
h∈R`, j
ch, q∗h) = A(k, j, x`, q∗h) = A(k, j, x`, q j).
Therefore,
C(k, n/s; i, a′1, a′2, . . . , a′k)
= C(k, n/s; i,A(k, 1, x`, q j), . . . ,A(k, k, x`, q j)) = x`,i.
Let us add the following modification to this proof, in order to keep the privacy of the part in which Alice reads
a bit. When Alice invokes the algorithm Q and receives the k queries Q(k, n/s; i) = (q1, . . . , qk), she also flips a
coin to choose uniformly at random a permutation σ of the elements in [k] and assigns for all j ∈ [k], qˆ j = qσ( j).
She continues with the algorithm to set for each j ∈ [k] and h ∈ R`, j, q∗h = qσ( j). Then, the h-th server responds
with the answer
a∗h = A∗(s, r, h, ch, q∗h) = A(k,σ( j), ch, q∗h).
Next she calculates aˆ j to be
aˆ j = ∑
h∈R`, j
ah = ∑
h∈R`, j
A(k,σ( j), ch, q∗h)
= A(k,σ( j), ∑
h∈R`, j
ch, q∗h) = A(k,σ( j), x`, q∗h)
= A(k,σ( j), x`, qσ( j)).
Finally, by assigning
a′j = aˆσ−1( j) = A(k,σ(σ−1( j)), x`, qσ(σ−1( j))) = A(k, j, x`, q j),
she completes with the last step of the algorithm. We can see that the privacy of the s parts is kept since each server
is required to invoke the algorithm A with the parameter σ( j). Since the permutation σ was chosen uniformly at
random, the distribution σ( j) is identical for any choice of `, one of the s parts of the database where Alice wants
to retrieve a bit. Lastly, the privacy of the bit that Alice reads is guaranteed from the privacy of the PIR protocol
P .
The coded PIR protocol P∗ uploads D(P ; n/s, k) bits to each server and downloads D(P ; n/s, k) from each
server. Thus, we get that U∗(P ; n,m, s) = m ·U(P ; n/s, k) and D∗(P ; n,m, s) = m · D(P ; n/s, k).
9IV. CONSTRUCTIONS OF CODED PIR SCHEMES
In this section we give several methods to construct k-server PIR codes with the properties specified in Section III.
As we shall see the properties of k-server PIR codes are similar to some of the existing codes in the literature,
such as one-step majority logic codes [10], codes with locality and availability [15], [16], [21], [22], [24], and
combinatorial objects such as Steiner systems. We point out that the simple-parity code is the optimal 2-server PIR
code and thus A(s, 2) = s+ 1. Therefore, we focus in this section only on the case where k > 2.
A. The Cubic Construction
Our first construction is based on the geometry of multidimensional cubes. Let us assume that s = σk−1 for
some positive integer σ . We will give a construction of an [m, s] k-server systematic PIR code, where m = σk−1+
(k− 1)σk−2 = s+ (k− 1)s(k−2)/(k−1). This code will be denoted by CA(σ , k).
The information bits in CA will be denoted by xi1 ,i2 ,··· ,ik−1 , where 1 6 i j 6 σ for j ∈ [k− 1]. The (k− 1)σk−2
redundancy bits, which are partitioned into k− 1 groups, are denoted and defined as follows:
p(ξ)i1 ,i2 ,··· ,iξ−1 ,iξ+1 ,··· ,ik−1 =
σ
∑
iξ=1
xi1 ,i2 ,··· ,ik−1 ,
for ξ ∈ [k− 1].
In the next example we demonstrate the construction of the code CA(σ , 3).
Example 3. Assume that k = 3 and s = σ2 for some positive integer σ . The code CA(σ , 3) has in this case
2σ redundancy bits. The codewords are represented in a square array of size (σ + 1)× (σ + 1), without the bit
in the bottom right corner. The information bits are stored in a σ ×σ subsquare, and the remaining bits are the
redundancy bits such that all rows and all columns are of even weight; see Fig. 2. So, for i ∈ [σ ],
p(1)i =
σ
∑
j=1
xi, j ,
p(2)i =
σ
∑
j=1
x j,i.
Fig. 2. The cubic construction for 3-server PIR code. The bit xi, j can be recovered by itself, the bits in the i-th row besides xi, j, and the
bits in the j-th column besides xi, j.
One can verify that every information bit, xi1 ,i2 for i1, i2 ∈ [σ ], has three mutually disjoint sets such that xi1 ,i2
is a linear function of the bits in each set. These sets are {xi1 ,i2}, {xi1 ,1, . . . , xi1 ,i2−1, xi1 ,i2+1, . . . , xi1 ,σ , p(1)i1 }, and
{x1,i2 , . . . , xi1−1,i2 , xi1+1,i2 , . . . , xσ ,i2 , p(2)i2 }. Note that the cell in the bottom right corner was removed since it is
not used in any of the recovering sets. Finally, we conclude from this example that
A(σ2, 3) 6 σ2 + 2σ ,
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and the storage overhead is 1+ 2σ , which approaches 1 when σ becomes large enough. 2
Next, we explicitly prove that the code CA(σ , k) is a k-server PIR code.
Theorem 6. For two positive integers σ and k, the code CA(σ , k) is a k-server PIR code. In particular, we get that for
any positive s
A(s, k) 6 s+ (k− 1)ds 1k−1 ek−2.
Proof: For any information bit xi1 ,i2 ,··· ,ik−1 in the code CA(σ , k), the following k sets
R(0)i1 ,··· ,ik−1 = {xi1 ,i2 ,··· ,ik−1},
R(ξ)i1 ,··· ,ik−1 = {xi1 ,··· ,iξ−1 ,δ,iξ+1 ,··· ,ik−1 : δ 6= iξ} ∪ {p
(ξ)
i1 ,··· ,iξ−1 ,iξ+1 ,··· ,ik−1},
for ξ = 1, 2, · · · , k− 1,
are all disjoint, and for all 1 6 ξ 6 k− 1 we have
xi1 ,i2 ,··· ,ik−1 = ∑
x∈R(ξ)i1,··· ,ik−1
x.
Therefore, CA(σ , k) is a k-server PIR code.
For the general construction of arbitrary values of s, let σ be such that (σ − 1)k−1 < s 6 σk−1. Using the code
CA(σ , k), we add k− 1 sets, each of σk−2 redundancy bits, to the information bits to form a k-server PIR code.
In case that s < σk−1, we simply treat the missing bits in the square as zeros. Hence,
A(s, k) 6 s+ (k− 1)σk−2 = s+ (k− 1)ds 1k−1 ek−2.
For a fixed k, the asymptotic behavior of the storage overhead in the cubic construction is given by 1+O(s− 1k−1 ),
which already proves that the asymptotic storage overhead approaches 1, that is,
lim
s→∞ A(s, k)s = 1.
However, as we shall see in the sequel, it is still possible to improve the value of A(s, k) for specific values of s
and k, and to find constructions which their storage overhead approaches 1 faster than the decay exponent given
by the cubic construction. Lastly, we note that a recursive form of this construction appears in [17] for the purpose
of constructing batch codes.
B. PIR Codes Based on Steiner Systems
The idea behind a construction of any k-server PIR code C is to form, for every information bit, k mutually
disjoint subsets of [m], such that the information bit can be recovered by a linear combination of the bits in each
set. Assume that C is a systematic [m,m− r = s] k-server PIR code. Then, we can partition its bits into two parts;
the first one consists of the s information bits, denoted by x1, . . . , xs and the second one is the r redundancy bits
p1, . . . , pr, where every redundancy bit pi is characterized by a subset Si ⊆ [s] such that pi = ∑ j∈Si x j.
According to this representation of systematic codes, every collection S = (S1, . . . , Sr) of subsets of [s] defines
a systematic [s+ r, s] linear code CB(S). In the next lemma, we give sufficient (but not necessary) conditions such
that the code CB(S) is a k-server PIR code.
Lemma 7. Let S = (S1, . . . , Sr) be a collection of subsets of [s], such that
1) For all i ∈ [s], i appears in at least k− 1 subsets,
2) For all j, ` ∈ [r], |S j ∩ S`| 6 1.
Then, CB(S) is a k-server PIR code.
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Proof: For any information bit xi, i ∈ [s], according to the first condition there exist some k − 1 subsets
Si1 , . . . , Sik−1 , such that i ∈ Si j for j ∈ [k− 1]. For each j ∈ [k− 1], let R j be the set R j = {x` : ` ∈ Si j , ` 6=
i} ∪ {pi j}, and finally let Rk = {xi}. According to the second condition all these k sets are mutually disjoint.
Finally, it is straightforward to verify that xi is the sum of the bits in every set, and thus CB(S) is a k-server PIR
code.
After determining the conditions in which the code CB(S) is a k-server PIR code, we are left with the problem of
finding such collections of subsets. Our approach to fulfill the conditions stated in Lemma 7 is to search for existing
combinatorial objects in the literature. One such an object is a Steiner system. A Steiner system with parameters t,
`, n, denoted by S(t, `, n), is an n-element set S together with a set of `-element subsets of S (called blocks) with
the property that each t-element subset of S is contained in exactly one block. It is also commonly known that the
number of subsets in a Steiner system S(t, `, n) is (nt)/(
`
t) and every element is contained in exactly (
n−1
t−1)/(
`−1
t−1)
subsets.
In order to satisfy the conditions in Lemma 7, we chose Steiner systems with t = 2 so the intersection of every
two subsets contains at most one element. Furthermore, in a Steiner system S(2, `, n), the number of subsets is
(n2)/(
`
2) = n(n− 1)/`(`− 1) and every element is contained in (n− 1)/(`− 1) subsets. Thus, we conclude with
the following theorem.
Theorem 8. If a Steiner system S(2, s−1k−1 + 1, s) exists, then there exists an [m = s+ r, s] k-server PIR code where
r = s(k−1)
2
s+k−2 . Thus, under this assumption we have
A (s, k) 6 s+ s(k− 1)
2
s+ k− 2 . (1)
Moreover, if a Steiner system S(2, k− 1, r) exists, then we have a k-server PIR code with parameters [m, s] = [r+
r(r−1)
(k−1)(k−2) ,
r(r−1)
(k−1)(k−2) ]. Thus,
A
(
r(r− 1)
(k− 1)(k− 2) , k
)
6 r+ r(r− 1)
(k− 1)(k− 2) . (2)
Proof: Let S be a Steiner system S(2, s−1k−1 + 1, s), so the number of subsets in S is
r =
s(s− 1)
( s−1k−1 + 1)
s−1
k−1
=
s(k− 1)2
s+ k− 2 ,
and every element is contained in
s− 1
(s− 1)/(k− 1) = k− 1
subsets. We also have that the intersection of every two subsets contains at most one element, so the conditions
in Lemma 7 hold and CB(S) is a k-server PIR code. To prove the bound given in (2), let τ = (r2)/(k−12 ) be the
number of (k− 1)-element subsets of S(2, k− 1, r), and denote them by S1, S2, · · · , Sτ ⊂ [r]. Let us construct the
dual Steiner system S′(2, r−1k−2 , τ) which consists of r (
r−1
k−2 )-element subsets of [τ ] denoted by S ′1, S ′2, . . . , S ′r, and
has the property that S ′i = {a|a ∈ [τ ], i ∈ Sa}. We now use the first statement in (1) to construct the code CB(S′).
It is clear that the redundancy of CB(S′) is given by r, and the code length is given by r+ τ = r+ r(r−1)(k−1)(k−2) .
Example 4. A finite projective plane of order q, with the lines as blocks, is an S(2, q + 1, q2 + q + 1) Steiner
system. Since q+ 1 = (q
2+q+1)−1
(q+2)−1 + 1, we conclude that there exists an [s+ r, s] (q+ 2)-server PIR code, with
s = q2 + q+ 1 information bits and
r =
(q2 + q+ 1)(q+ 1)2
q2 + q+ 1+ q+ 2− 2 =
(q2 + q+ 1)(q+ 1)2
(q+ 1)2
= q2 + q+ 1
redundancy bits. Note that the storage overhead of this code is 2. 2
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In order to evaluate the bound 2 in Theorem 8, one is required to figure out the existence of S(t, `, n) in gen-
eral. Indeed, Wilson Theorem claims that for a fixed `, and sufficiently large n, a Steiner system S(2, `, n) exists
given that the following two conditions (also known as divisibility conditions) are satisfied (see [26]–[28] for more
details):
1) n(n−1)
`(`−1) ∈ Z, and
2) n−1`−1 ∈ Z.
Wilson Theorem guarantees the existence of S(2, k− 1, r) for infinitely many values of r. Hence, for a fixed k,
there are arbitrary large values for r such that the bound in (2) holds. Hence, the redundancy behaves asymptotically
according to A(s, k)− s = O(s1/2), which improves upon the cubic construction.
C. One-step Majority Logic Codes
One-step majority logic decoding is a method to perform fast decoding by looking at disjoint parity check con-
straints that only intersect on a single bit (see [10] - Chapter 8.) These parity check constraints correspond to the
codewords in the dual code, and hence, for a linear code [n, k, d], the goal is to find, for each i ∈ [n], a set of
codewords in the dual code that intersect only on the i-th bit. These codewords are said to be orthogonal on the
i-th bit. The maximum number of such orthogonal vectors in the dual code (for every bit) is denoted by J, and if
J = d− 1, then the code is called completely orthogonalizable.
In other words, if an [n, k] code has J orthogonal vectors on the i-th coordinate for some i ∈ [n], then its dual
code C⊥ has k− 1 = J codewords that are orthogonal on coordinate i. Assume that these codewords are given by
c⊥j = xi + x j1 + x j2 + · · ·+ x jp j ∀1 6 j ∈ J, (3)
where the sets {i}, and { j1, j2, . . . , jpi} for j ∈ [J] are mutually disjoint. Such [n, k, d] code with J orthogonal
vectors for each i ∈ [n] is called a one-step majority logic code with J orthogonal vectors. Note that the definition
of one-step majority logic codes is almost identical to the one of PIR codes given in Definition 4. While one-step
majority logic codes guarantee that orthogonal vectors (or mutually disjoint sets) exist for all the bits in the code,
in PIR codes we require this property only for the s information bits. While it is not always straightforward to
construct an appropriate generator matrix from a given code such that the k-server PIR property holds, for the case
of one-step majority logic codes, we can always pick a systematic generator matrix and hence the PIR property
follows. Lastly we note that the idea of using one-step majority logic codes was motivated by the recent work on
codes for locality and availability in [16].
We demonstrate the construction of such codes in the following example.
Example 5. Consider a (15, 7) cyclic code generated by the polynomial
g(x) = 1+ x4 + x6 + x7 + x8.
The parity-check matrix of this code in the systematic form is given by
H =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1

.
We observe that the following codewords in C⊥
h3 =(0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1),
h1+5 =(0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1),
h0+2+6 =(1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1),
h7 =(0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1),
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are orthgonal on coordinate 14. That gives us five mutually disjoint sets {3, 11, 12}, {1, 5, 13}, {0, 2, 6}, {7, 8, 10},
and {14} that are required in Definition 4 to make five different queries on server 14. The same statement is cor-
rect for all other coordinates due to the cyclicity of the code. So, C is a 5-server PIR code. The storage overhead
of the coded PIR scheme based on C is given by 1code rate = 157 , which is significantly better than the uncoded PIR. 2
There are several algebraic constructions for one-step majority logic codes. However, the explicit relation between
the code length and redundancy is only known for a few of them. Type-1 Doubly Transitive Invariant (DTI) Codes
(see [10] - p. 289) are cyclic codes with almost completely orthogonalizable property. An explicit relation between
the code length m = (2M − 1), code dimension (s), and the number of orthogonal codewords in the dual code
(J), is known for specific choices of these parameters:
• Case I. Let θ, ` be two positive integers. For M = 2θ` and J = 2` + 1, the redundancy of the type-1 DTI
code of length m is given by
r = (2θ+1 − 1)` − 1. (4)
We refer to these codes by CC1(θ, `).
• Case II. Let λ, ` be two positive integers. For M = λ` and J = 2` − 1, the redundancy of the type-1 DTI
code of length m is given by
r = 2M − (2λ − 1)` − 1. (5)
We refer to these codes by CC2(λ, `).
We refer the reader to [10] for the algebraic construction and the calculation method used in deriving these
parameters.
Theorem 9. For any positive integers θ, `, and λ, the Type-1 DTI codes CC1(θ, `), CC2(λ, `) are (2` + 2)-server, and
2`-server PIR codes, respectively. In particular, we get that
A(22θ` − (2θ+1 − 1)`, 2` + 2) 6 22θ` − 1,
A((2λ − 1)` − 1, 2`) 6 2λ` − 1,
and hence for any fixed k, there exists a family of k-server PIR codes with asymptotic storage overhead of 1+O(s− 12 ).
Proof: We have already shown that a one-step majority logic code with J orthogonal vectors, is also a (J+ 1)-
server PIR code. So we are left with only calculating the code dimensions according to the redundancies in (4)
and (5).
• For CC1(θ, `), the code dimension is given by s = m− r = 22θ` − (2θ+1 − 1)`.
• For CC2(λ, `), the code dimension is given by s = m− r = (2λ − 1)` − 1.
So the upper bounds are validated. For the asymptotic analysis, we point out that for a given fixed J, as the number
of servers grows, the rates of the codes in both cases I, and II become arbitrary close to 1. In particular, when k
is fixed and s becomes large, the storage overhead in CC2(λ, `) is
2λ` − 1
(2λ − 1)` − 1 ≈ (
2λ
2λ − 1 )
` ≈ 1+ `
2λ − 1 = 1+O(s
− 1` ),
which is an improvement compared to Theorem 6 in the asymptotic regime. An even better storage overhead is
achieved by CC1(θ, `) codes in the asymptotic regime:
22θ` − 1
22θ` − (2θ+1 − 1)` = 1+O(s
− 12 ). (6)
Note that this construction not only outperforms the former ones with respect to the upper bound on the asymp-
totic storage overhead, but also gives a bound on A(s, k) that does not depend on k is in the asymptotic regime.
Considering that the construction based on Steiner systems also result in a similar bound, we ask the following
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two questions regarding the asymptotic storage overhead behavior of k-server PIR codes.
Question 1. Is (6) the optimal asymptotical behavior for A(s, k)?
A more challenging question would be to show the same statement for finite numbers. In particular,
Question 2. Are there any values of s and k > 3 such that A(s, k) < s+√s?
D. Constant-Weight Codes
Assume that G is a generator matrix of a systematic k-server PIR code C of length m and dimension s. We
rewrite G as
G = [Is|Ms×r], (7)
where Is is the s× s identity matrix and Ms×r corresponds to the r parities in C. Let us look at the systematic PIR
codes from a graph theory point of view by interpreting M as the incidence matrix of a bipartite graph G with
partite sets X = {x1, x2, . . . , xs} and P = {p1, p2, . . . , pr}, and edges E = {{xi, p j}|Mi j = 1}. We call C by
the Systematic PIR code based on G. The following lemma is an equivalent statement to Lemma 7.
Lemma 10. Let G be a bipartite graph with partite sets X = {x1, x2, . . . , xs}, P = {p1, p2, . . . , pr}, and the in-
cidence matrix M, where k − 1 = minx∈X deg(x). Further, assume that G has no cycles of length 4. If C is the
systematic code based on G with generator matrix defined in in (7), then C is a k-server PIR code of length m = s+ r
and dimension s.
Proof: Consider xi and k − 1 of its parity neighbors {pi1 , pi2 , . . . , pik−1} ⊂ P . Let R
j
i ⊂ X denote the
neighbor set of pi j . Since G is 4-cycle free, the sets R
j
i \ {xi} (for a fixed i and j ∈ [k− 1]) are mutually disjoint.
It is also easy to see that {xi}, and {pi j} ∪ R
j
i \ {xi} (for j = 1, 2, . . . , k− 1) form k disjoint recovery sets for
ui. In other words,
pi j = ∑
xα∈R ji
xα ⇒ xi = pi j + ∑
xα∈R ji \{xi}
xα for j = 1, 2, · · · k− 1.
Now we are ready to proceed to the final construction of k-server PIR codes, which will be first demonstrated
by an example.
Example 6. Consider the 3-server PIR code C given by the systematic generator matrix
G = [I10|M10×5] =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1

.
The corresponding bipartite graph is also shown in Fig. 3.
We observe that deg(xi) = 2 for all i as expected since we only need k− 1 = 2 elements in N (xi) to recover
xi, where N (α) is the neighborhood set of α. Moreover,
|N (xi) ∩N (x j)| 6 1 for i 6= j, (8)
which guarantees that the recovering sets for xi are mutually disjoint. 2
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Fig. 3. The bipartite graph G associated with the matrix M10×5.
The requirement that deg(xi) > k− 1 can be replaced with deg(xi) = k− 1 in this construction. This motivates
us to look at constant-weight codes where the codewords are all rows in the matrix M, such that the condition
in (8) still holds. For instance, we look at a constant weight code with weight k− 1 and minimum distance 2k− 4,
which guarantees the condition in (8). Let M(k, r) be the list of the largest code of length r whose codewords
have weight k− 1 and their minimum distance is 2k− 4. CD(k, r) is a k-server PIR code defined by its systematic
generator matrix G(k,r) = [I|M(k, r)].
We use the notation B(n,w, d) to denote the maximum number of codewords of length n and weight w with
minimum distance d. There are numerous works and studies aiming to determine the precise values of B(n,w, d)
in general, but the explicit formula is only found for the trivial cases. A complete collection of the known precise
values and both upper bounds and lower bounds on B(n,w, d) is given in [3].
Theorem 11. For any k the code CD(k, r) is a k-server PIR code. In particular, we get that for any positive integer k
A
(
B(r, k− 1, 2k− 4), k) 6 B(r, k− 1, 2k− 4) + r.
Proof: Let G be the bipartite graph whose incidence matrix is M(k, r). It is clear that deg(x) = k− 1 for all
x ∈ X . Also,
|N (x)| = |N (y)| = k− 1,
|{N (x) ∪N (y)} \ {N (x) ∩N (y)}| > 2k− 4
⇒ {N (x) ∩N (y)}| 6 1.
Hence, all of the conditions in Lemma 10 are satisfied and CD(k, r) is a k-server PIR code. To validate the param-
eters in the theorem it suffices to note that |M(k, r)| = B(r, k− 1, 2k− 4), so we have B(r, k− 1, 2k− 4) rows in
G, and r, the length of the codewords in M(k, r), determines the redundancy.
Example 7. The only known explicit formula for B(n,w, d) is when w = 2 and d = 2. It is easy to see that any
two different codewords of weight 2 have distance at least 2 as well. Hence B(n, 2, 2) = (n2). So,
A
((
n
2
)
, 3
)
6 n+
(
n
2
)
. (9)
2
According to inequality 9, we observe again that the asymptotic behavior of A(s, 3)− s is O(s1/2). The con-
struction based on Steiner systems and the last construction based upon constant-weight codes are both equivalent
to the problem of finding bipartite graphs with s vertices on the left and r vertices on the right, where all the left
vertices have degree k, the graph has girth at least 6, while minimizing the value of r. Clearly, if a Steiner system
with the desired parameter exists, then it is an optimal solution. However, constant-weight codes provide a solu-
tion in the general case particularly when the desired Steirner system does not exist. The following theorem on
bipartite graphs is both well-known and trivial (see for example Proposition 7 in [20]), and shows that by using
this method of construction for k-server PIR codes, we can not achieve a better asymptotic storage overhead than
the one achieved by Steiner systems. We include here the proof for the sake of completeness of the results in the
paper.
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Theorem 12. Let G be a bipartite graph with partite sets X = {x1, x2, . . . , xs} and P = {p1, p2, . . . , pr}, where
deg(x) = k > 2 for all x ∈ X . If the graph has girth at least 6, then r(r− 1) > sk(k− 1). Hence, for a fixed k, we
have r = O(s1/2).
Proof: Let N (x) denote the neighbor set of the vertex x. Since the graph has no 4-cycles, then there are no
i, j,∈ [s] and a, b ∈ [r], such that
{pa, pb} ⊂ N (xi), and
{pa, pb} ⊂ N (x j).
Therefore, (
r
2
)
> ∑
i∈[s]
(|N (xi)|
2
)
= s
(
k
2
)
.
V. OPTIMAL STORAGE OVERHEAD FOR FIXED s AND k
In this section, we study the value of A(s, k) for small s and k, in particular we give an upper bound on A(s, k)
for all values of s 6 32 and k 6 16. In order to give the best upper bounds, we benefit from a few supplementary
lemmas that together with the constructions introduced in section IV form a recursive method in deriving the upper
bounds on A(s, k).
Note that the constructions introduced in Section IV do not cover all values of s and k. The following lemmas
give simple tools to derive upper bounds for all values of s and k.
Lemma 13. We have the following inequalities for all non-negative integer values of s, k, s′, and k′:
(a) A(s, k+ k′) 6 A(s, k) + A(s, k′),
(b) A(s+ s′, k) 6 A(s, k) + A(s′, k),
(c) A(s, k) 6 A(s, k+ 1)− 1,
(d) A(s, k) 6 A(s+ 1, k)− 1.
Proof: To prove the inequality in (a), assume that C and C ′ are k-server and k′-server PIR codes with param-
eters [m, s] and [m′, s], and their generator matrices are given by G and G′, respectively. It is easy to see that the
concatenation of C and C ′ is a (k+ k′)-server PIR code with parameters [m+m′, s] and its generator matrix is
given by Gconc = [G | G′]. To prove the inequality in (b), assume again that C and C ′ are k-server PIR codes with
parameters [m, s] and [m′, s′], and their generator matrices are given by G and G′, respectively. The direct sum
code (also known as the product code) of C and C ′ is a k-server PIR code with parameters [m+m′, s+ s′] whose
generator matrix is given by
G∗ =
[
G 0s×m′
0s′×m G′
]
.
To prove (c), let us assume that C is a (k + 1)-server PIR code with parameters [m, s] and a generator ma-
trix G. According to Definition 4, for every information bit ui, i ∈ [s], there exist k + 1 mutually disjoint sets
Ri,1, · · · , Ri,k+1 ⊂ [m] such that for all j ∈ [k], ui is a linear function the bits in Ri, j. It is now clear that delet-
ing one of the coordinates from G or equivalently puncturing the code C in one of its coordinates can truncate at
most one of these disjoint recovery sets. Hence the punctured code Cpunc whose parameters are given by [m− 1, s]
is a k-server PIR code. We postpone the proof of part (d) to the end of this section, where we discuss whether
Definition 4 is a property of the generator matrix or it can be interpreted as a property of the code itself.
Lemma 14. If k is odd, then A(s, k+ 1) = A(s, k) + 1.
Proof: Utilizing part (c) in Lemma 13, it only suffices to show that if k is odd, then A(s, k+ 1) 6 A(s, k) + 1.
To do so, assume that C is a k-server PIR code with parameters [m, s] and generator matrix G. For any i ∈ [s]
we should be able to find k disjoint subsets of columns where the columns in each subset sum up to the vector ei.
If the sum of all columns in G is 0 ,then clearly the sum of the remaining columns (the ones that are left out of
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TABLE III
UPPER BOUND FOR A(s, k) FOR SMALL VALUES OF s AND k. FOR EACH k, THE VALUE ON THE LEFT REPRESENTS THE SIZE OF THE BEST
PIR CODE CONSTRUCTIONS I.E. A(s, k), AND THE RIGHT COLUMN REPRESENTS THE STORAGE OVERHEAD A(s,k)s ASSOCIATED WITH
THAT CONSTRUCTION. BY LEMMA 14 THE VALUE OF A(s, k) FOR ODD k IS GIVEN BY A(s, k+ 1)− 1. STARRED VALUES ARE PROVED
TO BE OPTIMAL.
s\k 2 3 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
1 2∗ 2.00 3∗ 3.00 4∗ 4.00 6∗ 6.00 8∗ 8.00 10∗ 10.0 12∗ 12.0 14∗ 14.0 16∗ 16.0
2 3∗ 1.50 5∗ 2.50 6∗ 3.00 9∗ 4.50 12∗ 6.00 15∗ 7.50 18∗ 9.00 21∗ 10.5 24∗ 12.0
3 4∗ 1.33 6∗ 2.00 7∗ 2.33 11∗ 3.67 14∗ 4.67 18∗ 6.00 21∗ 7.00 25∗ 8.33 28∗ 9.33
4 5∗ 1.25 8 2.00 9 2.25 12∗ 3.00 15∗ 3.75 20 5.00 24 6.00 27∗ 6.75 30∗ 7.50
5 6∗ 1.20 10 2.00 11 2.20 13 2.60 19 3.80 24 4.80 26 5.20 29 5.80 31∗ 6.20
6 7∗ 1.17 11 1.83 12 2.00 14 2.33 21 3.50 26 4.33 28 4.67 35 5.83 40 6.67
7 8∗ 1.14 12 1.71 13 1.86 15 2.14 23 3.29 28 4.00 30 4.29 38 5.43 43 6.14
8 9∗ 1.13 13 1.63 14 1.75 20 2.50 28 3.50 34 4.25 40 5.00 48 6.00 54 6.75
9 10∗ 1.11 14 1.56 15 1.67 23 2.56 30 3.33 38 4.22 45 5.00 53 5.89 60 6.67
10 11∗ 1.10 17 1.70 18 1.80 24 2.40 35 3.50 41 4.10 48 4.80 57 5.70 61 6.10
11 12∗ 1.09 19 1.73 20 1.82 25 2.27 37 3.36 42 3.82 50 4.55 62 5.64 67 6.09
12 13∗ 1.08 20 1.67 21 1.75 26 2.17 39 3.25 43 3.58 52 4.33 64 5.33 69 5.75
13 14∗ 1.08 21 1.62 22 1.69 27 2.08 41 3.15 44 3.38 54 4.15 66 5.08 71 5.46
14 15∗ 1.07 22 1.57 23 1.64 29 2.07 43 3.07 45 3.21 58 4.14 68 4.86 74 5.29
15 16∗ 1.07 23 1.53 24 1.60 34 2.27 44 2.93 46 3.07 62 4.13 70 4.67 80 5.33
16 17∗ 1.06 24 1.50 25 1.56 37 2.31 45 2.81 47 2.94 64 4.00 72 4.50 84 5.25
17 18∗ 1.06 27 1.59 28 1.65 38 2.24 46 2.71 48 2.82 66 3.88 76 4.47 86 5.06
18 19∗ 1.06 28 1.56 29 1.61 39 2.17 47 2.61 49 2.72 68 3.78 78 4.33 88 4.89
19 20∗ 1.05 29 1.53 30 1.58 40 2.11 48 2.53 50 2.63 70 3.68 80 4.21 90 4.74
20 21∗ 1.05 30 1.50 31 1.55 41 2.05 49 2.45 51 2.55 72 3.60 82 4.10 92 4.60
21 22∗ 1.05 31 1.48 32 1.52 42 2.00 50 2.38 52 2.48 74 3.52 84 4.00 94 4.48
22 23∗ 1.05 32 1.45 33 1.50 47 2.14 51 2.32 53 2.41 76 3.45 86 3.91 100 4.55
23 24∗ 1.04 33 1.43 34 1.48 50 2.17 52 2.26 54 2.35 78 3.39 88 3.83 104 4.52
24 25∗ 1.04 34 1.42 35 1.46 51 2.13 53 2.21 55 2.29 80 3.33 90 3.75 106 4.42
25 26∗ 1.04 35 1.40 36 1.44 52 2.08 54 2.16 56 2.24 82 3.28 92 3.68 108 4.32
26 27∗ 1.04 38 1.46 39 1.50 53 2.04 55 2.12 57 2.19 84 3.23 96 3.69 110 4.23
27 28∗ 1.04 39 1.44 40 1.48 54 2.00 56 2.07 58 2.15 86 3.19 98 3.63 112 4.15
28 29∗ 1.04 40 1.43 41 1.46 55 1.96 57 2.04 59 2.11 88 3.14 100 3.57 114 4.07
29 30∗ 1.03 41 1.41 42 1.45 56 1.93 58 2.00 60 2.07 90 3.10 102 3.52 116 4.00
30 31∗ 1.03 42 1.40 43 1.43 57 1.90 59 1.97 61 2.03 92 3.07 104 3.47 118 3.93
31 32∗ 1.03 43 1.39 44 1.42 58 1.87 60 1.94 62 2.00 94 3.03 106 3.42 120 3.87
32 33∗ 1.03 44 1.38 45 1.41 59 1.84 61 1.91 63 1.97 96 3.00 108 3.38 122 3.81
the k subsets) is also the vector ei. Hence the code is actually a (k+ 1)-server PIR code and we are done. If not,
append one more column to G so that the sum of all the columns is 0. Then the resulting matrix is a generator
matrix for a (k+ 1)-server PIR code.
By selecting the best constructions for A(s, k) from section IV for each individual s and k, and then updating
the table with respect to lemmas 13 and 14, we are finally able to give an upper bound on A(s, k) for all values
of s, and k. Table III contains the upper bound obtained on A(s, k) for all k 6 16 and s 6 32. We observe that
the storage overhead is significantly improved compared to the traditional uncoded PIR scheme. Moreover, the
inequality A(s, k) > s+√s always hold. The asymptotic behavior of A(s, k) is discussed in next section.
In the remainder of this section, we seek to address the following key question: Is it the generator matrix that
has the k-server PIR property, or it can be interpreted as a property of the code? Let us begin the discussion with
the following definition.
Definition 15. We say that an [m,m− s] binary linear code C has property Bk if there exist s cosets of C such that:
a) Every coset contains k disjoint vectors, and
b) The linear span of these cosets is the entire space Fm2 .
Theorem 16. If the code C has the property Bk, then its dual code is a k-server PIR code.
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Proof: We show that the definition 15 and 4 are equivalent. Clearly, Definition 15 above is a property of a
code, not a matrix. Now, given a generator matrix G with for the PIR code C′, we get a code C with property Bk
by simply taking C to be the code defined by G as its parity-check matrix. Now lets proceed to the other direction.
Assume that a code C with property Bk is given. Let C1,C2, · · · ,Cs be the s linearly independent cosets of C,
each containing k disjoint vectors. Start with an arbitrary parity-check matrix H for C. Let σ1,σ2, · · · ,σs denote the
syndromes of C1,C2, . . . ,Cs with respect to H. Let S be the s× s matrix having these syndromes as its columns.
Note that condition b) of Definition 15 guarantees that S is full-rank. Now form the s× (m+ s) matrix [H|S],
and perform elementary row operations on this matrix to get [H′|S′] where S′ is the s× s identity matrix. Then
the matrix H′ is a generator matrix for the k-server PIR code C′, which is clearly the dual code of C.
The following lemma from the theory of the linear codes is essential for the proof of part (d) in Lemma 13. We
leave the proof to the reader.
Lemma 17. Let C be an (m, k) binary linear code. Given a positive t 6 m− k, let C1,C2, . . . ,Ct be cosets of C, and
let s1, s2, . . . , st be their syndromes. Then
dim
(
span(C1,C2, . . . ,Ct)
)
= k+ t
if and only if the syndromes s1, s2, . . . , st are linearly independent.
We are now able to prove part (d) of Lemma 13 as promised earlier.
Proof of Lemma 13.(d): Suppose A(s, k) = m. Then there exists an [m,m− s] code C with property Bk.
Moreover, no column in a parity check matrix for C is entirely zero, otherwise A(s, k) 6 m− 1. Puncture the
code C in any position. Upon puncturing, a) above remains true trivially. It remains to show that we can find some
s− 1 cosets of the punctured code that generate Fm−12 , which is a direct result of Lemma 17. Hence the resulting
[m− 1,m− s] code has property Bk, and it is a k-server PIR code.
VI. ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF CODED PIR
While deriving the precise values of A(s, k) was our initial interest, studying the asymptotic behavior of A(s, k) is
no less interesting. In particular, lower bounds will help us to find constructions with the optimal storage overhead.
Asymptotically, we will analyze the value of A(s, k) when s is fixed and k is large, and vice versa. We briefly
mention that we solved the first case while the lower bounds for the latter are yet to be found.
A. Storage overhead for fixed s
Let us first focus on the case where s, the ratio between the length of the whole data and the storage size of
each server, is a fixed integer number, but k, the PIR protocol parameter, is large.
Theorem 18. For any pair of integer numbers s, and k, we have
A(s, k) > 2
s − 1
2s−1
k, (10)
with equality if and only if k is divisble by 2s−1.
Let us use the following example to illustrate the proof.
Example 8. Assume s = 3, and C is an (m, 3) PIR code with k-server PIR property. The generator matrix of C
contains m columns, each of length 3. The list of all possible options is shown in table IV. Let us assume that the
column multiplicities are given by µa,µb,µc,µx,µy,µz, and µw.
Since the code has the k-server PIR property, there should be k disjoint sets of columns each with ha as their
sum. ha, hb + hz, hc + hy, and hx + hw are all such possibilities. It is easy to notice that there is no combination
of the columns of type hb, hc, and hx that would give ha. So, each of the k sets should include at least one of the
other columns. Therefore,
µa +µy +µz +µw > k.
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TABLE IV
LIST OF ALL 7 DIFFERENT TYPE OF COLUMNS USED IN CONSTRUCTING AN (m, 3)-PIR CODE.
ha hb hc hx hy hz hw10
0
 01
0
 00
1
 01
1
 10
1
 11
0
 11
1

Similar to {hb, hc, hx}, we have three other sets {hx, hy, hz}, {hc, hz, hw}, and {hb, hy, hw} that are incapable of
recovering the first data chunk by their own. So we have three more constraints
µa +µb +µc +µw > k,
µa +µb +µx +µy > k,
µa +µc +µx +µz > k.
Redoing the above argument for the second and the third information chunk, we get the following three new
constraints
µb +µc +µy +µz > k,
µb +µx +µz +µw > k,
µc +µx +µy +µw > k;
And, by adding all the above constraints we have
A(3, k) = m = µa +µb +µc +µx +µy +µz +µw >
7
4
k.
It is trivial that when k is divisible by 4, setting µa = µb = µc = µx = µy = µz = µw = k4 gives the equality. We
can indeed use the results from Lemmas 13, and 14 to prove that A(3, k) = d 7k4 e. 2
Proof of Theorem 18: For the general s, the generator matrix contains at most 2s − 1 different non-zero
columns. Assume C is a k-server PIR code with length m and dimension s. Therefore, for each 1 6 i 6 s, one
can find k disjoint subsets of the columns with their equal to
ei = (0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0)t.
Similar to the example, we look at all the (s− 1)-dimensional subspaces V in Fs2, such that ei /∈ V. It is clear that
no combination of the columns in V can retrieve ei. So, each of the k subsets should include at least one vector
from Vc, where Vc denotes the complement of V in Fs2. Now let V be a subspace of Fs2 that does not contain the
unit vector ei. Then ∑v∈Vc µv > k is a constraint involving µei .
There are
(2s − 2)(2s − 4) · · · (2s − 2s−2)
(2s−1 − 1)(2s−1 − 2) · · · (2s−1 − 2s−2) = 2
s−1
such subspaces for each i, which gives us 2s−1 constraints for each ei. It suffices to show that there are exactly
2s − 1 unique constraints after merging all these sets. Now we recall that the non-zero codewords of the simplex
code of length 2s − 1 are precisely the supports of all sets of the form Vc, where V is an (s− 1)-dimensional
subspace of Fs2 (see [10] - page 380 for proof.) It is now clear that we have 2s − 1 unique constraints since there
are exactly 2s− 1 codewords of weight 2s−1 in the simplex code of length 2s− 1. Moreover, exactly 2s−1 of these
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codewords have value 1 in a fixed coordinate. In other words, we get the vector 2s−112s−1 as the sum of all these
codewords. So,
2s−1 ∑
v∈Fs2
µv > (2s − 1)k ⇐⇒
A(s, k) = m = ∑
v∈Fs2
µv >
(2s − 1)
2s−1
k.
Let us fix s. The introduced lower bound in (10) along with its equality condition shows that A(s, k) = O(k),
when k becomes large. In other words A(s, k) ∼ 2k for small s andk large.
B. Storage overhead for fixed k
It was already shown that for fixed k, there are elementary constructions to achieve storage overhead A(s,k)s
arbitrary close to 1. We are yet to determine how fast it decreases. Table V summarizes the constructions introduced
in the previous section with their asymptotic behavior. Note that, the explicit formula for the constructions based
on constant-weight codes is only known for k = 3.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF THE CONSTRUCTIONS FOR A(s, k) WITH RESPECT TO THE ASYMPTOTIC CODE REDUNDANCY (A(s, k)− s).
Code construction Upper bound on A(s, k) Asymptotic redundancy
Cubic construction A(s, k) 6 s+ (k− 1)ds 1k−1 ek−2 O(s1− 1k−1 )
Steiner System A
(
n(n−1)
(k−1)(k−2) , k
)
6 n+ n(n−1)
(k−1)(k−2) O(s
1
2 )
Type-1 DTI codes (1) A
(
22θ` − (2θ+1 − 1)` , 2` + 2
)
6 22θ` − 1 O(s 12 )
Type-1 DTI codes (2) A
(
(2λ − 1)` − 1, 2`
)
6 2λ` − 1 O(s1− 1` )
Constant weight codes A
(
(n2), 3
)
6 (n2) + n O(s
1
2 )
We observe that non of the introduced constructions achieves storage overhead less than 1+O(s− 12 ). However,
it is not clear if that is the optimum value one can get. So far, the best (and trivial) lower bound is given by
A(s, k) > s+O(log s).
VII. PIR ARRAY CODES
In all the constructions we presented so far, we assumed that the database was partitioned into s parts, where
every server stores n/s bits that were considered to be a single symbol. In this section we seek to extend this idea
and let every server store more than a single symbol. For example, we can partition the database into 2s parts of
n/(2s) bits each such that every server stores two symbols. This can be generalized such that every server stores a
fixed number of symbols. One of the benefits of this method to construct PIR codes is that we can support setups
in which the number of bits stored in a server is n/s where s is not necessarily an integer. Furthermore, we will
show that it is also possible to improve, for some instances of s and k, the value of A(s, k) and hence the storage
overhead as well. Since every server stores more than a single symbol we treat the code construction as an array
code and thus we call these codes PIR array codes. When a server receives a query q then it resposes with multiple
answers corresponding to the number of symbols stored in the server. We illustrate the idea of PIR array codes in
the next example.
Example 9. Assume that the database x is partitioned into 12 parts x1, x2, . . . , x12 which are stored in four servers
as follows.
21
Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4
x1 x2 x3 x1 + x2 + x3
x2 x3 x1 x6
x4 x5 x4 + x5 + x6 x4
x5 x6 x8 x9
x7 x7 + x8 + x9 x9 x7
x8 x11 x11 x12
x10 + x11 + x12 x11 x12 x10
Thus, every server stores 7 parts, each of n/12 bits, so n12/7 bits are stored in each server and the storage overhead
is 7/3. Using this code, it is possible to invoke a 3-server linear protocol P(Q,A, C). Assume Alice seeks to read
the bit x1,i for i ∈ [n/12], she invokes the algorithm Q to receive three queries Q(3, n/12; i) = (q1, q2, q3). The
first sever is assigned with the query q1, the second and fourth servers with the query q2 and the third server with
the query q3. Each server responds with 7 answers corresponding to the 7 parts it stores. Alice receives all 28
answers but only needs 5 answers to retrieve the value of x1,i. From the first server she receives the answer a1 =
A(3, 1, x1, q1), from the second server she receives two answers a′2 = A(3, 2, x2, q2) and a′′2 = A(3, 2, x3, q2),
from the third server a3 = A(3, 3, x3, q3), and lastly from the fourth server she receives a4 = A(3, 2, x1 + x2 +
x3, q2). Note that from the linearity of the protocol P , we have
a′2 + a′′2 + a4 = A(3, 2, x2, q2) +A(3, 2, x3, q2) +A(3, 2, x1 + x2 + x3, q2) = A(3, 2, x1, q2),
and thus x1,i is retrieved by applying the algorithm C
x1,i = C(3, n/12; i, a1, a′2 + a′′2 + a4, a3).
2
In the last example, we see that we repeated the same code four times. That was done in order to guarantee
that the number of symbols stored in each server is the same. We could instead show only the first two rows of
the first code and then claim that by interleaving of the column which stores only one symbol it is possible to
guarantee that each server stores the same number of symbols. While we saw that in this example it is possible
to construct PIR codes with more flexible parameters, the download communication was increased and we needed
only 5 out of the 28 received answers. However, since the number of symbols in each server is fixed (and will be
in the constructions in this section) the communication complexity order is not changed.
In general, we refer to an m1 × m2 array code as a scheme to encode s information bits x1, . . . , xs into an
array of size m1 ×m2. An (m1 ×m2, s)-server coded PIR protocol is defined in a similar way to Definition 3. We
formally define PIR array codes.
Definition 19. A binary [m1 ×m2, s] linear code will be called a k-server PIR array code if for every information
bit xi, i ∈ [s], there exist k mutually disjoint sets Ri,1, . . . , Ri,k ⊆ [m2] such that for all j ∈ [k], xi is a linear function
of the bits stored in the columns of the set Ri, j.
Very similarly to Theorem 5 we conclude that if there exists an [m1 × m2, s] k-server PIR array code and a
k-server linear PIR protocol P then there exists an (m1 ×m2, s)-server coded PIR protocol that can emulate the
protocol P . Next, we give another example of PIR array code which explicitly improves the storage overhead.
Example 10. We give here a construction of [2 × 25, 6] 15-server PIR array code. The 6 information bits are
denoted by x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6 and are stored in a 2× 25 array as follows:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
x1 x1 x1 x1 x1 x2 x2 x2 x2 x3 x3 x3 x4 x4 x5
x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x3 x4 x5 x6 x4 x5 x6 x5 x6 x6
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
x1+x2+x3 x1+x2+x4 x1+x2+x5 x1+x2+x6 x1+x3+x4 x1+x3+x5 x1+x3+x6 x1+x4+x5 x1+x4+x6 x1+x5+x6
x3+x4+x5 x3+x5+x6 x3+x4+x6 x3+x4+x5 x2+x5+x6 x2+x4+x6 x2+x4+x5 x2+x3+x6 x2+x3+x5 x2+x3+x4
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The first row specifies the server number. The other two rows indicate the bits which are stored in each column.
It is possible to verify that this construction provides a 15-server PIR array code. For example for the first bit we
get the following 15 sets:
{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6, 16}, {7, 17}, {8, 18}, {9, 19}, {10, 20}, {11, 21}, {12, 22}, {13, 23}, {14, 24}, {15, 25}
where it is possible to retrieve the value of x1 by the bits stored in the columns of each group.
The number of bits stored in each server of this example is n/3 and thus s = 3. If we had to use the best con-
struction of an [m, 3] 15-server PIR code, then A(3, 15) = 26 servers are required, while here we used only 25
servers. Hence, we managed to improve the storage overhead for s = 3 and k = 15. 2
We extend Example 10 to a general construction of PIR array code. Let t be a fixed integer t > 2. The number
of information bits is s = t(t+ 1), the number of rows is m1 = t and the number of columns is m2 = m′2 +m′′2 ,
where m′2 = (
t(t+1)
t ) and m
′′
2 = (
t(t+1)
t+1 )/t. In the first m
′
2 columns we simply store all tuples of t bits out of
the t(t+ 1) information bits. In the last m′′2 columns we store all possible summations of t+ 1 bits. There are
(t(t+1)t+1 ) such summations and since there are t rows, t summations are stored in each column, so the number of
columns for this part is m′′2 = (
t(t+1)
t+1 )/t. We also require that in the last m
′′
2 columns every bit appears in exactly
one summation. Note that Example 10 is a special case of this construction for t = 2. A code generated by this
construction will be denoted by CA−PIR(t).
Theorem 20. For any integer t > 2, the code CA−PIR(t) is an [m1 ×m2, t(t+ 1)] k-server PIR array code where
s = t+ 1,m1 = t,m2 =
(
t(t+ 1)
t
)
+
(t(t+1)t+1 )
t
, k =
(
t(t+ 1)
t
)
,
and its storage overhead is
(t(t+1)t ) + (
t(t+1)
t+1 )/t
t+ 1
.
Table VI compares the improvement in the number of servers, and thus storage overhead, when using the PIR
array code CA−PIR(t). For t = 2 and s = 3, k = 15 we know the exact value of A(s, k) according to Table III,
and for all other values of t we get a lower bound on the value of A(s, k) according to Theorem 10.
TABLE VI
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE CODE CA−PIR(t) AND THE CORRESPONDING BEST VALUES OF A(s, k).
t s k m2 A(s, k)
2 3 15 25 26
3 4 220 385 > 413
4 5 4845 8721 > 9387
5 6 142506 261261 > 280559
The constructions presented in this section are examples for improvements either in the storage overhead or the
existence of codes with other parameters which cannot be achieved by the non-array PIR codes. We hope that more
constructions will appear to further improve these parameters.
VIII. ALTERNATIVE CONTRUCTIONS
In this section we discuss several more constructions of coded PIR schemes with special properties. First we
start with the extension of binary coded PIR schemes to non-binary codes. Then, we show how other extensions
of PIR schemes, namely robust PIR and coalitions PIR, can be adjusted for the coded PIR setup.
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A. Non-binary Coded PIR Schemes
In this section we extend the results from Section IV to the non-binary setup. Since the construction from The-
orem 5 consists of a k-server linear PIR protocol and a k-server PIR code we require the protocol and code to be
over the same field GF(q), where q will be a power of a prime number.
In the extension of Definitions 1 and 3 we require that the database and the responses of algorithm A in the
protocol are over the same field GF(q). Therefore, in Definition 2 we also require the linearity of A to be over
GF(q). The Definition of k-server PIR codes remains the same while the linearity of the sets is over GF(q). For
any s and k we denote by A(s, k)q to be the smallest m such that an [m, s] k-server PIR code exists over the field
GF(q). The construction of k-server PIR protocol in Theorem 5 remains almost identical.
We summarize here the required modifications in this proof, under the assumptions mentioned above.
1) The database x is partitioned into s parts x1, . . . , xs which are encoded using a generator matrix G over GF(q)
as before to receive the coded data which is stored in the m servers (c1, . . . , cm).
2) Alice wants to read the symbol x`,i. She invokes the algorithm Q and receives the k queries as (q1, . . . , qk).
3) We assume that there exist k mutually disjoint sets R`,1, . . . , R`,k ⊆ [m], such that for j ∈ [k], we can write
x` = ∑
h∈R`, j
αhch,
where the coefficients αh are over the field GF(q).
4) The output of the algorithm Q∗(m, s, n; i) is assigned as before with the queries and the received answers a∗h
and ah.
5) For j ∈ [k] the value of a′j is calculated according to
a′j = ∑
h∈R`, j
αhah = ∑
h∈R`, j
αhA(k, j, ch, q∗h)
= A(k, j, ∑
h∈R`, j
αhch, q∗h)=A(k, j, x`, q∗h)=A(k, j, x`, q j).
6) Alice calculates the symbol x`,i as before according to
C(k, n/s; i, a′1, a′2, . . . , a′k)
= C(k, n/s; i,A(k, 1, x`, q j), . . . ,A(k, k, x`, q j)) = x`,i.
We can always use the binary constructions as k-server PIR codes (assuming for example that the code is given
by a parity check matrix), so we can conclude that A(s, k)q 6 A(s, k). However, we note that the definition of
k-server PIR codes is very much related to the recently well-studied locally recoverable (LRC) codes [15], [22],
[24]. A code C over GF(q) is said to have locality r if every symbol in each codeword from C can be recovered by
a subset R of at most r other symbols from the codeword. The set R is called a recovering set of the symbol. A code
C is called an LRC code with locality r and availability t if every symbol has t pairwise disjoint recovering sets,
each of size at most r. In case the code is systematic while the locality and availability requirements are enforced
only on the information symbols then it is called an LRC code with information locality r and availability t [22].
Our definition of k-server PIR code is closer to LRC codes with information locality, however we don’t require
the code to be systematic. Furthermore, the major difference is that we don’t restrict the size of the recovering
sets. The connection between k-server PIR codes and LRC codes with availability is stated as follows. The proof
is omitted since it is straightforward.
Theorem 21. If a code C is an LRC code with information locality r (or locality r) and availability t = k− 1 then it
is a k-server PIR code.
For the non-binary setup, there are several constructions of LRC codes with availability, see for example [16],
[21], [22], [24]. While it is not necessarily immediate to find examples where we get better results, in terms of the
value of Aq(s, k), than the binary case, it is still possible to improve the minimum distance of the code.
The following example will example demonstrates this idea.
24
Example 11. Assume that s = 2 and k = 3, we already sas that A(2, 3) = 5, however the minimum distance of
such a code is 3, which is optimal. Let us consider the case q = 4, then the two information symbols x1, x2 are
encoded to the following five symbols:
(x1, x2, x1 + x2, x1 +αx2, x1 +α2x2),
where α is a primitive element in GF(4). It is possible to verify that this is a 3-server PIR code, and its minimum
distance is 4, where in the binary case we could only have minimum distance 3. 2
B. Robust PIR and t-private PIR
Lastly, we briefly note here that our constructions of k-server PIR codes can be used also to construct coded PIR
protocols for robust PIR and t-private PIR [29].
A k-out-of−` PIR protocol is a PIR protocol with the additional property that Alice can compute the value of
xi even though she received only k out of the ` answers. In order to emulate such a protocol P we simply use an
[m, s] `-server PIR code and repeat the same steps as in Theorem 5. Then, we can emulate the protocol P and if
at most `− k answers were not received, then Alice will still be able to privately recover the value of the bit xi.
A t-private PIR protocol is a PIR protocol where every collusion of up to t servers learns no information on
the bit Alice seeks to read from the database. Given a t-private PIR protocol P , we follow again the same steps
of Theorem 5 to construct an (m, s)-server coded PIR protocol P∗. Since the protocol P is t-private, we get also
that every collusion of t servers learns no information on i, the bit that Alice attempts to read. This property results
from observing that every t servers have together at most t out of the queries that Alice sends to the servers, and
according to the t-privacy property of the protocol P , the same privacy is preserved for the protocol P∗ as well.
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS
A new framework to utilize private information retrieval in distributed storage systems is introduced in this
paper. The new scheme is based on the idea of using coding instead of the replications in the traditional PIR
protocols, when the storage size of each server is much less than the size of the database. We have shown that
among the three main parameters in measuring the quality of k-server PIR protocols i.e. communication complexity,
computation complexity, and storage overhead, the first two remain the same and the latter improves significantly in
the asymptotic regime. In particular, for a fixed k and a limited server size, the storage overhead becomes 1+ o(1)
as the number of servers becomes large.
The optimal storage overhead with the coded PIR is also studied and the explicit value is derived for many cases.
The presented constructions lead to coded PIR schemes with storage overhead 1+O(s−1/2) for any fixed k, where
s is the ratio between the size of the database and the storage size of each server. Hence, it will be interesting
to determine whether this asymptotic behavior can be improved. Another research direction is the construction of
other coded schemes which are compatible with existing PIR protocols, such as the ones given in Sections VII
and VIII.
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